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Abstract 
The role of structural shielding mass in the design, verification, and in-flight performance of International 
Space Station (ISS), in both the natural and induced orbital ionizing radiation (IR) environments, is 
reported. 
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Introduction 
Orbital inclination (51.6') and altitude (nominally between 350 km and 400 km) determine the natural 
ionizing radiation environment of the International Space Station (ISS). The high inclination orbital 
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galactic cosmic rays (1-3) than would be the case in a lower inclination orbit with h e  same altitude range, 
largely as a result of the overall shape and magnitude of the geomagnetic field (1-3). In addition, an 
induced radiation environment is produced by inelastic collisions of primary galactic and solar cosmic ray 
nuclei, as well as trapped protons, with ISS structural materials (4-6). ISS structure provides a shielding 
depth (10g/cm2 to 100 g/cm2) substantially greater than that typical of unmanned spacecraft (< 1 g/cm2) (6). 
ISS shielding depths are comparable to the inelastic collision lengths of energetic galactic cosmic rays 
(GCRs) (7) that pass through the geomagnetic field with minimal deflection (E > 10 GeV). Hadronic 
showers (secondary particle cascades consisting of energetic protons, neutrons, mesons and nuclear 
fragments) (8) initiated in ISS structure and shielding by inelastic collisions of minimally-deflected, high- 
energy GCRs are expected to make a larger contribution to the single event effect (SEE) and total ionizing 
dose environments than would be the case in less massive spacecraft (4-6). Similarly, the hadronic showers 
initiated by GCR collisions with air nuclei in Earth's atmosphere produce secondary particle cascades (7, 8) 
leading to the well know Pfotzer radiation maximum, a concern for aircraft avionics, at altitudes near 20 
km (9, 10). The atmospheric shielding depth at 20 km altitude is about 50 g/cm2 air. 
ISS must meet all performance requirements during continuous exposure to the nominal total ionizing dose 
(TED) and single event effect (SEE) environments for not less than 15 years. Periodically, ISS is also 
exposed to the extreme SEE environment produced by solar energetic particle events and must remain safe 
and functional during the events and recover to meet all performance requirements after the events. The 
performance of ISS hardware in the TID and SEE Environments must be verified by test and analysis prior 
to acceptance of hardware for flight. 
The ISS ionizing radiation environment for design and verification is defined in SSP-30512-Rev. C, (1) 
while electronic parts testing method and analysis procedures are defined in SSP-30513 Rev. B (2). Not all 
avionic equipment on ISS is subjected to the test and verification processes defined in SSP-305 12 and SSP- 
30513. Some lower criticality equipment is accepted on the basis of an assembled article high-energy 
proton screening test (1 1). 
Structural Shielding Mass 
The ISS ionizing radiatior, rec;t?iements Oocuments (1, 2) contains n~lo specific g~idelices or 
recommendations on how to account for the effects of structural shielding mass on the SEE or TID 
environments, though look-up tables describing the effects of simple A1 shielding mass geometries are 
included. For purposes of design and verification, small shielding depth environments have been assumed 
for the purpose of estimating worst-case TID and SEE effects. TID and SEE susceptible equipment outside 
the pressurized elements is generally assumed to be at the center of an aluminum sphere, 0.13cm to 0.51cm 
thick (shielding depth of 0.35g/cm2 to 1.5 g/cm2 Al). The corresponding values used for sensitive 
equipment inside the pressurized elements are 1.3cm to 5.lcm (shielding depth of 3.5 g/cm2 to 14 @m2 
All. 
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The shielding depths usually assumed for ISS design and verification are substantially smaller than the 
actual shielding depths. For a typical point internal to the ISS pressurized elements, detailed Sector 
Shielding (12), and CAD based (13-15) analysis of the as-built ISS structure reveals a cumulative shielding 
depth distribution function with a median (50%) value of between 50 and 60 g/cm2 and ranging from 10 to 
100 g/cm2 at the 10% and 90% points respectively. Similarly, the cumulative shielding depth distribution 
of ISS avionics enclosures external to the pressurized elements typically ranges from 4 g/cm2 to 20 g/cm2 
with a median value of 10 g/cm2 (15). It should be noted that no secondary particle design environment is 
specified SSP-305 12 Rev. C, tihough some analysis of secondary neutron and proton effects was completed 
for ISS optoelectronic devices labile to displacement damage produced by structural secondary and Earth- 
albedo neutrons (16). In the analysis presented below, the shielding mass distribution of avionics boxes 
mounted external to the pressurized elements are used with no additional contributions from the truss or 
pressurized element structure which either have relatively low mass and/or subtend only a small solid angle 
as viewed from the avionics box location. For avionics boxes mounted inside the pressurized elements, the 
avionics box mass distribution is simply added to the pressurized e!ement mass distribution with no 
consideration of local geometry. 
The Radiation Design Environment - Total Ionizing Dose 
The ISS TID ra.diation environment is specified for 500 km at solar maximum and includes trapped protons 
defined per AP8MAX and trapped electrons defined per AE8MAX. The contributions of solar and galactic 
cosmic rays and secondary particles are not included. Shielding mass effects are included in the form of 
look-up tables for A1 shielding mass in two simple geometries, as determined with the well known 
Shieldose model combined with the SSP-305 12 natural environment (1). Dose estimates at specific points 
in more complex ISS configurations can be made by combining the CAD or Sector (12-15) based shielding 
rnass ciistfi'viitioiis with iiie Al shielding look-up tables in SSP-3i5i2. D t e i  i i i i i i ~ ~  coiitrib~itioiis to TEE, 
such as galactic or solar cosmic rays and x-rays, uncertainties in the trapped radiation models, contributions 
from SEP and other space weather events, and degradation rates of exposed labile materials, are addressed 
through the application of a recommended design margin of 2X applied to the 500 km design environment. 
The ISS radiation design environment represents a conservative, low cost solution for ISS hardware design 
and verification. The selection of 500 km as a design point altitude is, in itself, a worst-case assumption 
because ISS operates between 350 km and 460 km. TID rates increase by a factor of about 3X between 
300 and 500 km, largely as a result of the altitude structure of the SAA. 
On-Orbit Observations - Total Ionizinp; Dose 
ISS is performing well within expectations with respect to TID to EEE parts and materials interior to 
structural shielding. With few short term exceptions, ISS has been flying at altitudes between 350 and 400 
km during the past 6 years, well below the 500 km specified for the worst-case radiation design 
environment in SSP 30512. TID accumulated to date is well below the performance degradation threshold 
(1 krad) for even for the most sensitive ISS EEE parts and will remain so for the life of ISS. Ionizing 
radiation dose measurements, conducted within the habitable voiume using thermo iuminescent dosimeters 
and crew personal dosimeters, range from 5 to 12 pGy (tissue) (0.5 to 1.2 mrads (tissue)) per hour, 
depending on location in the habitable volume, corresponding to an annual dose range of 44 to 105 mGy 
(tissue) (4.4 to 10.5 rads (tissue)) (17-19). For most of the subject dosimetry measurement times, ISS has 
been flying at altitudes below 400 km during the declining phase of the last solar maximum. The variation 
in TID with location in the habitable volume is expected as a result of variations in the average line-of-sight 
shielding depth with location in ISS (12-15). Pre-flight worst-case estimates of TID internal to the ISS 
pressurized elements were less than 20 rads (Si)/year in all cases (12), about twice the maximum observed 
dose rates. 
The Radiation Design Environment - Single Event Effects 
Two different natural single event environments, for design and verification, are specified in SSP-30512 
Rev. C (1). The nominal SEE environment is based on AP-8 solar minimum model for trapped protons and 
the CREME86, space weather index, M=4, solar minimum model for galactic cosmic rays. The nominal 
SEE environment is specified for a 500 krn altitude at solar minimum so as to define a global worst-case 
environment for both trapped protons and GCR (1). The extreme SEE environment is also specified for 
500 km. The extreme SEE environment for ISS design and verification is based on the October 1989 SEP 
event; a 99& percentile worst-case extreme SEE environment with respect to both energetic proton and 
energetic heavy ion fluxes (20-23). 
Methods for testing and analysis of EEE parts in support of ISS avionics performance verification in the 
nominal and extreme SEE environments are described in detail in SSP-30513 Rev. B (2). The Scott 
Effective Flux Approach (SCFA) (24), using a charged particle incident angle cut-off of 80' (normal 
incidence is 0') and an LET cut-off of 110 ~ e v c m ~ / m ~ ,  is used to calculate worst case estimates of on- 
orbit upset rates for ISS design and verification purposes. Pe~ersen (25) has shown that the I55 SCFA 
methods can overestimate or underestimate predicted on-orbit SEU rates compared to the Integral 
Rectangular Parallelepiped (IRRP) method for some classes of device geometry and relative radiation 
hardness. For the ISS 1Mx4 DRAM considered in detail below, an overestimation of about one order of 
magnitude is expected. In subsequent work, Peterson has demonstrated that a generalized Figure of Merit 
(FOM) approximation can produce useful SEU rate predictions (often comparable to much more complex 
detailed IRPP with shielding particle transport calculations) for a wide range of EEE part types, shielding 
mass environments and orbits (26). Barak, Reed and LaBel have analyzed this surprising result and 
established a sound theoretical basis for FOM (27). Below, SCFA and FOM SEU rate calculations are 
compared with observed on-orbit SETJ rates for an ISS 1x4M DR-A-M. 
Estimation of on-orbit SEU rates using either the SCFA or FOM requires heavy ion and proton test data in 
combination with the shielding mass distribution function. The DRAM die for the specific 1Mx4 DRAM 
(Texas Instruments 44400, 0.9 micron design rules, 13.7mm x 6 mm die size) used in the ISS multiplexer 
demultiplexer MDMs was selected on the basis of results of TID and SEE testing conducted by the 
European Space Agency (ESA) (28) on the essentially identical 4Mx1 device. The normal-incidence heavy 
ion test data can be fit to the weil howii  'Weibull function, as shown beiow, allowing calculation of SETJ 
cross section, o, as a function of ion effective iinear energy transfer, L. 
o (L) = o (s)(l - exp{-[(L - L,)/W]~}) where, 
o (s) = the saturated SEE cross-section at large values of L; o (s) = 3.00 x 10-~cm~/bit 
o Q = the SEU cross-section for any value of L, 
L = the Linear Energy Transfer (LET) of the ion species in the beam, and 
Lo: W, and S are empirical parameters, adjusted for a best fit to the observed data with 
Lo = 0.99 ( ~ e ~ - c m ~ ) / m ~ ,  W = 7.7 ( ~ e ~ - c m ~ ) / n l ~ ,  a d s = 1.3 
Proton testing yielded a threshold proton energy, Ep, equal to 30MeV, and a saturation cross section, 5,: 
equal to 2.00 x 10-'~cm~/bit (28). 
The shielding mass distribution functions as determined by the CAD method (12-15) for the ISS MDM 
DRAM reported on here is shown in Figure 1, and the physical locations of the external ISS MDMs are 
shown in Figure 2 and are calculated as described above, in the shielding mass section of this paper. 
The SEU FOM for the lx4M is calculated using the Weibull parameters derived from heavy ion test data as 
described in reference 26. 
FOM = o ( s ) / ( ~ ~ . ~ ~ ) ~ .  , where 
o (s) = o (s) = 3.00 x 10-~cm~/bit; the limiting SEU cross-section at large values of L, and 
=Lo + ~ ( 0 . 2 8 8 ) " ~  = the LET value at o (L) = 0.250 (s). 
The upset rate for a particular orbit, and an assumed 100 mils (0.71g/cm2) of A1 shielding, is then 
calculated using an orbit specific rate coefficient, Corb, that has ihe units upsets per bit-day (26) or, 
Rate (upsets/(bit day)) = FOM x Corb. 
The effect of shielding mass can be accounted for using the following very approximate equation (26), 
Corb/s~d = 2Corb - 0.5Corblog(t), where t is a shielding thickness in mils. 
MDM Model Shielding Distribution 
Figure 1: MDM 1Mx4 DRAM Structural Shielding Distributions. 
Figure 2: External MDM locations on ISS 
On-Orbit Observations - Single Event Effects 
The current configuration of the US segment of ISS (HightfStage 11) contains over 600 SEE susceptible 
avionics boxes and 3000 devices susceptible to SEE induced functional interrupt. During 4 years of flight, 
a total of 11 in-flight anomalies have been observed that mav be SEE related. No destructive SEE events 
have been observed. None of the SEE related anomalies show the strong correlations with SEP events, 
flight through the SAA, or flight at high latitudes as predicted using the design environment in combination 
with the assumption of low shielding mass. 
On-Orbit ISS MDM SEE Performance 
The performance of the ISS command and data handling system MDM units is of special interest in light of 
the critical nature of MDM function. During the first 4 years of flight, the 16 MDMs in the US Lab module 
have displayed only 3 performance anomalies that may be attributable to SEE processes (see Figure 3). 
The three possible SEE performance anomalies showed no correlation with SEP events or flight through 
the South Atlantic Anomaly, though two of the three occurred at latitudes near +5 1 degrees. MDM 
performance anomalies are driven by functional lockup of 80386SX microprocessor and the 82370 
controller. An average US Lab MDM anomaly rate of 4.4E-3 per day (6 per 4 years) was predicted using 
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Figure 3: SEE anomaly candidates - 2001 to 2005 
MDM = multiplexer demultiplexer; APS =Automatic Payload Switch; ASBSP = Assembly and Contingency Systen~ Baseband Signal 
Processor; AUAI = ACSIUCS Audio Interface Unit 
an assumed shielding mass of 14 g/cm2 and an assumed critical bit fraction of 20 percent of the total bit 
count in the critical devices. During the first 4 years of flight the observed anomaly rate for the 14 US Lab 
M M s  is 1.5 x per day ((3 per 4 ye=.), a fzctor of 2 !ox..rer than the pre-f ight verification estimate. No 
MDM anomalies were observed during any of the 23 > 100MeV solar energetic particle events (extreme 
SEE environments) that occurred between April 200 1 and June 2005. 
ISS MDMs are equipped with error detection and correction (EDAC) capability. The EDAC detects and 
corrects single-bit-per-data-word errors but only detects errors involving more than one bit per data word. 
No true, single word, double bit errors have been detected to date, though 13% of the DRAM SEU events 
observed to date involve 2 or more bits per 1 second telemetry reporting cycle. DRAM refreshes are 
initiated every 8 p e c  and take 8.2 seconds to complete so that at any time there are 125,000 refreshes in 
progress. The multiple upsets are most likely the result of a single charged particle event affecting 
physically adjacent DRAM cells that are not part of the same data word because the probability of two 
independent events in 1 sec is equal to the square of the single event rate and is therefore minute. 
DRAM SEUs for 6 of the external MDMs are plotted as a function of SEU latitude and longitude in Figure 
4. SEU data was collected for 155 calendar days, however, after accounting for occasional loss of 
telemetry signal (LOS) periods the actual SEU data collection time turns out to be 135 days. LOS is most 
likeljr between longitudes of +55 and +80 east as is apparent in Figure 4. This LC)S region coi-iesponds to a 
region where TDRSS-3 coverage cannot always be guaranteed due to scheduling issues. 
The expected increase in SEU counts in the South Atlantic Anomaly (SAA) and the high latitude or "horn" 
regions of the map are obvious. Table 1 shows the relative number of upsets in the SAA region, the high 
latitude horn regions, and the remainder of the orbital ground track, i.e. the mid latitude, non-SAA region. 
All 6 external MDMs are displaying nearly the same upset rate and very nearly the same distribution of 
upseLs in rhe three major geographic regions, except for &DM SO-1, which shows a lower SEU rate in the 
SAA region and MDM P 1 - 1, which shows a significantly higher rate overall. With the exceptions of MDM 
PI-1 and MDM SO-1, the overall variation between WlMs  is within that expected from Poisson process 
counting statistics. The SAA region makes a relatively small contribution to the total number of soft 
upsets, most of which occur in the horn and mid latitude regions. 
Figure 4: Aggregate ISS External MDM DRAM SEU Map; 155 days calendar time with 135 days data 
acquisition time after accounting for loss-of-signal (LOS) periods 
Table 2 shows a comparison of the observed average (of all 6 external MDMs listed in Table 1 and Figure 
4) external MDM DRAM SEU rate for the 135 day data acquisition time with estimates made using the 
SEFA and FOM SEU rate methods. The median value of the shielding mass distribution function (10 
g/cm2 Al) for external MDMs as shown in Figue 1 was used for both the SEFA and FOM estimates. The 
SEFA method overestimates the rate by a factor of 13, close to the one order of magnitude overestimate 
expected from inspection of Figure 5 of Reference 25, given the DRAM the heavy ion cross section and 
sensitive volume depth. The FOM method is in remarkably good agreement with the observed rate, 
overestimating by only a factor of 3.3 using the median shielding mass. 
Region 
SAA 
"Horns" 
Mid- 
Latitude 
Total 
and FOM models 
Table 1: ISS External MDM DRAM soft upsets corresponding to Figure 4; total count and breakdown by 
geographic region. [SAA region: Lat. 15 south to 45 south; Lon. 15 west to 70 west; North Horn: Lat. 35 to51.6 north: Lon. 20 
east through 0 to 160 west; South Horn: Lat. 35 to 51.6 south; Lon. 0 through 180 east to 135 west] 
Type 4 
73 
129 
97 
299 
Average on-orbit SEU Count per MDM 
10 g/cm' median shielding 
(SEUl135 days) 
268 +. 17 
Table 3 shows a comparison of the observed on-orbit rates for internal and external MDMs along with 
SEFA and FOM estimates fol- the corresponding shielding mass. Obviously the SEFA and FOM methods 
are underestimating the rates by overestimating the mitigating effects of shielding mass when median 
shielding mass is used as the basis of estimate. Both the SEFA and FOM methods produce much better 
agreement with the observed rates when rates are calculated using the shielding mass distribution function 
instead of the median value of the distribution as is shown in Table 4, even though neither approach takes 
Type-10 
69 
124 
90 
283 
Table 2: ISS External MDM DRAM soft upsets; a comp~rison of on-orbit rates with predictions of SEFA 
SEFA SEU Count 
1 ~~ / c rn%hie ld in~  
(SEW135 days) 
3574 
FOM SEU Count 
10g/cm2 Shielding 
(SEUl135 days) 
949 
Type-10 
41 
121 
96 
258 
Type-10 
72 
105 
84 
261 
Type-10 
81 
97 
78 
256 
Type4 
69 
108 
74 
251 
405 
684 
519 
1608 
secondary particle production in shielding into account. The improved agreement is largely a result of 
consistent overestimation of SEU rates for the lower mass end of the shielding mass distribution function. 
1 MDM: Median Shielding I On-orbit SEU Count I SEFA SEU Count FOM SEU Count 
for multiple bit errors) and comparison of on-orbit rates with predictions of SEFA and FOM models using 
median shielding values for estimate 
- 
pig. 1) 
Lab-1: 40 g/cm2 
Lab-3: 40 g/cm2 
PI-2: 10g!cr? 
S1-1: log/cm2 
Table 3: Effects of median shielding mass: ISS Internal External h4DM DRAM soft upset rates (corrected 
SEUl238 days) 
488 r 22 
490 r 22 
535 k 23 
488 -c 22 
MDM I On-orbit SEU Count I SEFA SEU Count 
rates (corrected for multiple bit errors) and comparison of on-orbit rates with predictions of SEFA and 
FOM models 
Summary and Conclusions 
FOM SEU Count 
Lab-1 
S1-1 
Detailed consideration of the effects of both the natural and induced ionizing radiation environment during 
ISS design, development, and flight operations has produced a safe, efficient manned space platform that is 
largely immune to deleterious effects of the LEO ionizing radiation environment. The assumption of a 
small shielding mass for purposes of design and verification has been shown to be a valid worst-case 
approximation approach to design for reliability, though predicted dependences of SEE effects on latitude, 
longitude, SEP events, and spacecraft structural shielding mass are not observed. The FOM method over 
predicts the rate for median shielding masses of about log/cm2 by only a factor of 3, while the SEFA 
method overestimated by about one order of magnitude as expected. The IRPP, SEFA, and FOM methods 
for estimating on-orbit SEU rates all utilize some version of the CREME-96 treatment of energetic particle 
interaction with structural shielding, which has been shown to underestimate the production of secondary 
particles in heavily shielded manned spacecraft (4-6 and 29-3 1). The need for more work directed to 
development of a practical understanding of secondary particle production in massive structural shielding 
for SEE design and verification is indicated. In contrast, total dose estimates using CAD based shielding 
mass distributions functions and the Shieldose Code provided a reasonable accurate estimate of 
accumulated dose in Grays internal to the ISS pressurized elements, albeit as a result of using worst-on- 
worst case assumptions (500 km altitude x 2) that compensate for ignoring both GCR and secondary 
particle production in massive structural shielding. 
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